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A Managerial Perspective on
the Porter Hypothesis
The Case of CO2 Emissions
Diane-Laure Arjaliès and Jean-Pierre Ponssard

••
Over the past decade, the debate on climate change has dramatically shifted. The strong evidence presented
by the scientific community through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) process established by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) has largely settled the discussion about whether an action should be taken to stabilize atmospheric
greenhouse gases (GHGs) (Parry et al., 2007). Climate change is now acknowledged as being a serious global threat which demands an urgent response. For example, the Stern Review on the economics of climate
change estimates that without any global action, the overall costs and risks of climate change would be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) each year, which could rise to 20% if
a wider range of risks and impacts are taken into consideration (Stern, 2006). The question is: what should
be the response to address the challenge of global warming while maintaining at the same time an economic
growth (Mc Kinsey Global Institute, 2008)? With this in mind, environmental concerns are becoming an
increasing central topic for strategic choices and decision-making by investors around the world.1
According to leading consultancy, investors would be more than 80% to consider climate change as a very or
somewhat important factor when investing (Mercer Investment Consulting & Carbon Disclosure Project,
2009). The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) was launched in 2000 to collect high quality information on
CO2 emissions. In 2009, it provided information concerning over 2,000 organizations in 66 countries, and
grouped no less than 475 institutional investors – holding $55 trillion in assets under management – and 60
purchasing organizations.2 However, despite assessing CO2 emissions as a key dimension to analyze when
selecting companies for the portfolios, a significant number of investors acknowledge to keep working on
how to integrate climate data into their existing systems, models and processes.3 Almost five years after the
European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System (EU ETS) debuts operation, Mercer concluded
its study by stating that only a very small handful of investors have succeeded in directly and systematically
taking into account climate considerations into their actual stock selection.

1. For example, the Fonds de Réserve pour les Retraites (FRR) – the major French public pension fund – declared: “Environmental
concerns and, in particular, the global warming’s impact on global economy and its different sectors put forward by the scientific
community, raise a lot of questions a long-term investor cannot ignore when deciding its global investment strategy.” (FRR, 2009)
2. Carbon Disclosure Project : https://www.cdproject.net
3. For example, hardly any investor anticipated in 2006 the increase by 62% of Rhodia’s stock due to a major reduction in total greenhouse
gas emissions (GHGs) in South Korea (Le Revenu, 2006).
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The discrepancy between the major restructuring consequences of the climate change challenge and the
relatively slow response of financial professionals may be explained by two very different factors. Firstly, for
years, environmental pressure had been perceived by investors neither as a risk nor as an opportunity which
could structurally impact companies’ bottom line. As a direct result, investors have historically regarded
explicitly and addressing environmental factors in their investment strategies as incompatible with their
fiduciary responsibilities (Innovest, 2007). The context has now significantly changed. Secondly, at a more
fundamental level, the lack of academic consensus on the macro-impacts of environmental regulations on
the profitability of firms did not provide a sound basis to develop operational tools.
Indeed, when analyzing the academic literature, two approaches emerge. On the one hand, a view, known
as the “Porter hypothesis” (Porter, 1991; Porter & van der Linde, 1995) asserts that stricter environmental
standards can spur innovations which enhance competitiveness and contribute to make companies more
profitable. This virtuous mechanism is said to lead to the so-called “win-win” situation in which both a
better environment and a higher financial performance are achieved. This view has benefited over the past
decades from a growing interest among politicians and practitioners.4
On the other, according to a neo-classical economic perspective, tightening environmental regulations
through norms or taxes, will reduce the choice set of the firm and cannot benefit a profit maximizing firm
(Fogler & Nutt, 1975). Indeed, Palmer et al. (1995) use the standard economic framework to demonstrate
that more stringent environmental constraints cannot generate a higher profit, even if the firm innovates.
They also provide counter arguments as regards the fact that more stringent environmental evidence in the
US in the 80’s relative to the EU or Japan would have caused the possible loss of competitiveness of US
industry.
The academic attention has then shifted from macro to micro evidence. Wagner (2003) reviews more than
20 empirical studies which have tested the Porter hypothesis and shows that no relationship between environmental regulations and financial performance can be demonstrated. Ambec and Lanoie (2008) identify
three possible ways in which environmental constraints may induce higher profit: cost reductions, increased
revenues and lower cost of capital. They review the empirical cases in this respect, pointing out positive or
contradictory evidence.
Altogether, it is not surprising that investors be still in search for adequate tools to assess the impacts of
more stringent CO2 regulation on their portfolios. In this chapter, we want to contribute to this question
by providing a systematic framework to evaluate the response of firms to this new environment. We take
the position that previous studies on the Porter hypothesis at the micro-level have neglected an important
factor that could explain the ambiguity of the empirical results: the managerial dimension of strategy, i.e.
the organizational conditions in which a firm elaborates and implements its strategy. We suggest that environmental regulations can systematically lead to a better financial performance only if the new strategic
choices have led to a transformation of organizational processes and management systems. This view is in
line with some previous work. For instance, Ambec and Barda (2002) associate the Porter hypothesis with
agency problems. Gabel and Sinclair Desgagné (1998) attribute the hypothesis on the prevalence of organizational routines. Our model also takes into consideration the fact that agents in the firm operate under
bounded rationality and informational constraints.

4. Since Gore (1993), politicians have viewed the green economy as a chance for growth and competitiveness for the industry. See also
Wagner (2003) on that subject.
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To elaborate our construction, we build upon a comparative study of three companies belonging to different
sectors, to wit: DuPont (chemicals), Lafarge (building materials) and Unilever (consumer goods). These
firms operate at different levels of the added value chain: DuPont provides components to manufacturers,
Lafarge belongs to the manufacturing sector and Unilever delivers goods for the final consumers. This
differentiated choice obeys a twofold will: 1) to provide a general model of change regardless of the firm’s
business and 2) to analyze the managerial dimension of the Porter hypothesis in firms which face different
forms of environmental regulations and pressures regarding climate change. Indeed, we believe that organizational and business diversities are key advantages when developing managerial models.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 explains what we mean by a managerial perspective, building
on Simons’ synthetic work on organizations (Simons, 1995). It also reviews a preliminary positioning of
firm’s environmental and social strategy in those terms, based upon an empirical survey of large French firms
(Arjaliès & Péan, 2009). This positioning will be used to construct our own typology. Section 3 introduces
this typology. It is hypothesized that firms follow a two stage process: at the first stage, the strategy of the
firm is associated with awareness/risk while at the second stage it is associated with vision/opportunities.
The relevance of this model to structure the strategies actually followed by DuPont, Lafarge and Unilever is
discussed in details. Section 4 revisits the Porter hypothesis. Section 5 comes back to investors, and draws
the implications of our results for the design of adequate tools to assess the impacts of climate change on
portfolio analysis, giving due consideration to the factors that may trigger the passage of a firm from stage
one to stage two. Section 6 concludes.

The Managerial Framework and Some Preliminaries Findings
on How Firms Manage CSR
The managerial framework

To adapt to its environment, a firm must keep innovating and evolving. According to bounded rationality
perspective (Cyert & March, 1963), firms should encourage organizational learning (Argyris & Schon,
1978) and local initiatives for generating emergent strategies (Mintzberg, 1989) while controlling that the
chosen strategies are well implemented. Simons (1995) has elaborated a comprehensive framework to analyze strategic and organizational change in this framework. It relies on four performance systems.
 The first two systems are key cognitive tools to “frame” what can and cannot be done both in terms
of behaviors and actions:
– Beliefs systems set the core values of the company to create a sense of commitment and belonging
on part of the employees.
– Boundary systems set the framing for strategic elaboration and analysis. They orientate managers’
actions by showing what is permitted.
 The other two systems refer to the planning and control procedures. In particular, they are concerned
with the information systems needed to support these procedures.
– Diagnostic systems typically involve a wide range of indicators, which reflect the different facets of
a company’s performance, for internal or external use. They aim at ensuring that managers meet
the firms’ strategic goals. Control is made by exception, with actions taken whenever reported
data widely differ from targets.
– Interactive systems involve a limited range of indicators to create a total determination of the
management on a selected set of goals. Their purpose is to stimulate organizational learning by
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encouraging managers to innovate. Control takes the form of a very high degree of interaction
along the hierarchical line. The interactive control systems will focus on areas varying from company to company according to a critical performance criteria.
It is the joint use of these four systems which permits firms to drive strategic renewal by favoring continuous
innovation and ensuring that the implemented strategic actions are coherent and efficient. A summary of
this process is provided in figure 1.
Strategy as
« Patterns in action »
Positioning for Tomorrow
INTERACTIVE
SYSTEMS
Strategic
Uncertainties

BELIEFS
Strategy as
« Perspective » SYSTEMS
Obtaining
Commitment to the
Grand Purpose

Core Values

Business
Strategy

Risks to Be
Avoided

BOUNDARY Strategy as
SYSTEMS « Position »
Staking out the
Territory

Critical
Performance
Variables

DIAGNOSTIC
SYSTEMS
Strategy as
« Plan »
Getting the job done

Figure 1: A Dynamic Relationship (source Simons, 1995)

In his research, Simons gives particular attention to the differences between diagnostic and interactive
systems. He points out the connection between the major sources of strategic uncertainty (regulatory
constraints, cost efficiency, launching of new products, etc.) and the interactive systems to be put in place.
He also emphasizes that the design of managerial compensation should be different in both systems. Compensation should typically be based on objective criteria for the diagnostic systems which are result oriented, and on subjective criteria for the interactive ones which are process oriented. Objective and subjective
criteria constitute the extrinsic part in the motivational system of the firm. The beliefs systems of the firm
have a direct role on the intrinsic motivation of the employees and as such contribute to their alignment
with the goals of the firm.5

5. That intrinsic (i.e. symbolic) and extrinsic (i.e. financial) motivation need to be thought as complements has become an important issue
(Bénabou & Tirole, 2006).
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The relevance of this framework has been illustrated by a number of case studies made by Simons and
others.6 Simons’ approach will be used as a starting point for our model. Two other dimensions need to be
added to provide our managerial framework. The first dimension refers to the necessary cross-functional
aspect of environmental strategies: interactive systems should be designed so as to promote horizontal interaction, for instance between functional and operational departments to evaluate the risks, and to design
appropriate responses. This cross-functional dimension of management systems is not addressed by Simons
in his typology while it is an important feature in the implementation of turnaround strategies.7 The second
dimension relates to the participation of external stakeholder such as NGOs and scientist in strategic deliberation. More than on any other corporate topics, environmental issues may involve an important number
of firms’ outsiders. As a result, Simons’ framework should be used both at the internal and external level,
focusing explicitly on the relationships between firms and their stakeholders.

How Firms Manage CSR: Some Preliminary Findings

In this section, we revisit a recent comparative analysis of the CAC 40 companies8 conducted by Arjaliès
and Péan (2009).9 The main finding of this analysis is puzzling: while companies have acknowledged the
strategic importance of CSR for businesses, they still devote limited ressources and time to such concerns.
The study demonstrates that companies have not yet developed appropriate management systems to trigger
strategic and practical change. According to the authors, this is the main reason explaining why no strategic
renewal has yet been conducted by these companies to meet the CSR challenge. In line with our general
management perspective, different elements can be put forward from this study:
CSR is now deemed to be essential for companies’ long-term survival.
CSR has progressively become a major issue at the corporate level. Indeed, companies must meet an increasing number of demands regarding CSR both from their clients and stakeholders. As a result, CSR
would become as of now a necessary pre-requisite for companies to be able to maintain their business and
their so-called “license to operate”.
However, the integration of CSR concerns remains limited in practice.
The recognition of CSR as a corporate issue has not been translated into operational goals. Firstly, CSR
has not yet generated many demonstrative business cases. Secondly, CSR demands are rarely framed on
the situations experienced by operational managers in practice. Thirdly, companies face difficulties when
implementing CSR strategies as a result of their lack of cross-functional approach. Finally, despite their
assertion on CSR importance for business, most companies would still separate CSR issues from business
related issues.
Diagnostic systems dominate for external reporting.
This focus of diagnostic systems on external reporting can be explained by the domination in practice of a
risk approach of CSR. In other words, management systems would be first used to avoid behaviors which
could endanger companies’ license to operate and not to generate strategic opportunities. The study gives
the evidence that the means dedicated by the companies to CSR are too limited to enable the generation of
6. See for instance Simons (1994), Bisbe & Otley (2004) and Marginson (2002).
7. In his analysis of change at Nissan, Goshn (2002) insists on setting ambitious targets for the company and on the key role of transversal
working groups to by-pass the inherited compartmentalized organizational structure of the company. See also Ponssard and Tanguy
(1993).
8. The CAC 40 companies are the 40 largest French listed companies.
9. This study is based on questionnaires and documentary evidence.
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structural strategic change. For example, the important feedback dimension of control systems is lacking in
many companies. This prevents from a systematic process of improvement of existing practices.
Interactive systems exist but their influence is limited.
As for diagnostic systems: interactive systems suffer from a lack of feedback, which makes the capitalization
on innovative ideas difficult. Moreover, managers’ commitment to such systems is limited, as a result of
their perception of CSR as being meaningless for business day-to-day. Thus, whereas companies assert that
CSR is likely to play a key role in terms of innovation and strategic renewal, only few of them are able to
design interactive systems to achieve the associated goals.
This study provides a broad picture in which it demonstrates that CSR is more and more integrated into the
beliefs systems of firms, but mainly as a risk/compliance issue. The diagnostic systems are adapted to provide
the data required by external bodies (regulatory and social rating agencies, NGOs…) through emerging
standards such as GRI (Global Report Initiative). Boundary systems are almost not impacted and there is
no CSR action program followed by innovative interactive systems. This shows that companies still separate
CSR actions from business day-to-day. We will see in this chapter that detailed case studies provide a less
extreme picture (see also the other case studies included in this volume). Our goal is precisely to provide a
systematic framework to organize isolated case studies.

The Two Stage Model for Implementing a CO2 strategy: From
Awareness/Risk to Vision/Opportunities
In this section, we elaborate on the general framework introduced in section 2 to formulate the hypothesis
on how firms implement their CO2 strategy. The hypothesis is explained as a two-stage model. In simple
words, stage one would correspond to the situation described in the preceding survey and applied to CO2:
climate change appears as an awareness/risk issue mostly of concern at the corporate level. We shall hypothesize that some operational actions may still take place, as long as the corresponding programs are
directly aligned with the compliance goals formulated at the corporate level. Stage two is not based on the
survey but on our detailed case studies. We shall hypothesize that firms in stage two will consider climate
change as an opportunity and characterize the four management systems that, in our view, would support
such a strategy. An important theoretical question will then be addressed: are there conditions that could
trigger the passage for firms from stage one to stage two? This question will be addressed in section 4, while
revisiting the Porter hypothesis.

The Main Ideas Underlying the Model

We start by giving the main ideas of the model and then discuss them in full.
Stage 1: Awareness/Risk
CO2 risk is identified but awareness is limited in the sense that only some managers in the firm, typically
functional managers at the corporate level, are aware of this risk and can provide quantifiable measures in
terms of loss of revenues and/or increase of costs. Neither the beliefs nor the boundary systems are affected
by change.
Some specific actions may be undertaken to counter change due to CO2 regulation in the environment,
such as delaying its impact on firm’s activities through lobbying and/or mitigating emissions in production.
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Firm’s control systems remain in place. Eventually, diagnostic systems are by increments updated to measure
and mitigate the actual emissions. No specific interactive system is designed to elaborate and implement
radical change.
Stage 2: Vision/Opportunities
The core values of the firm address the challenge created by CO2 emissions in a positive way through a
reformulation of the firm’s vision and corporate culture. This induces a reformulation of the beliefs and
boundary systems to drive strategic and organizational change.
Changes in the boundary systems make possible strategic formulation at the corporate level for the whole
sector, along the chain value, with the goal to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the firm relative to
its competitors, suppliers and customers.
The strategic orientation is explained through action plans. These action plans are explicitly introduced
into the control systems. Dedicated diagnostic systems are integrated into the general planning and control
systems of the firm. Dedicated interactive systems are designed to follow up the targets associated with the
new vision.

Revisiting DuPont, Lafarge and Unilever Strategies through this Model

Our model is now applied to revisit the respective implementations of CO2 strategy in DuPont, Lafarge
and Unilever. Figure 2 provides a synthesis view of these firms in 2008. It gives their CO2 emissions levels
as of today and summarizes their current targets on these emissions. The three firms generate CO2 mainly
through their manufacturing activities, with some or many European Union (EU) plants eligible for the
EU-ETS10, in our case for Unilever and Lafarge respectively. In the US, all firms have plants that would
potentially be subject to a CO2 regulation. However, the relative significance of these industrialized CO2
emissions is more important for Lafarge, with cement representing both its major product and its main
source of emissions, than for the other two companies which are diversified. DuPont is an upstream company which produces industrial components for electronics, textiles, motor vehicles, construction materials,
agriculture and plastics and so forth whereas Unilever is a downstream company which produces consumer
goods through around 400 brands covering food, household and personal care products. The ’test’ of our
model for these differentiated companies will provide an indication of their potential value to handle many
different situations.
DuPont

Lafarge

Unilever

Headquarters’ location

Wilmington, USA

Paris, France

London, UK

Revenues

MM $ 30.5

19 MM €

41 MM €

Employees

60 000

84 000

174 000

CO2 emissions (Mt) from CDP 2008

9.3

108.9

1.2

Current Target in 2008

15% for 2015/2004
(absolute value)

20% 2010/1990
(relative value)

25% 2012/2004
(relative value)

Figure 2: DuPont, Lafarge and Unilever at a Glance

10. EU-ETS refer to the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System, which is a major pillar of EU climate policy.
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The case studies were elaborated in two steps: step one, a standard questionnaire was filed by the authors
based on public information (company reports, carbon disclosure reports (CDP), press articles, articles
published in academic journals…); step two, interviews with companies’ representatives were utilized to
complement this outside view.11
We are using the outputs of these case studies to give substance to our model. In this construction, it will
be important to keep in mind that we refer to CO2 in a broad sense so as taking into account the diversity
in which the operations of these three companies affect the climate. DuPont’s involvement started with the
recognition of the CFC impact on the ozone hole. Unilever’s involvement mainly comes through the sourcing of palm oil and its impact on deforestation. There have been different policies to tackle these different
impacts and the firms’ responses varied accordingly. Moreover, the public questioning on the detrimental
effects of CFC emissions on CO2 emissions from manufacturing and on CO2 emissions from deforestation
have not appeared at the same time and triggered different responses.
The first scientific paper hypothesizing a connection between CFC and the ozone hole is from 1974. In
1987, the Montreal protocol to reduce and eliminate CFC was signed by 24 Nations and the EU. In 2007,
191 Nations revisited the Montreal protocol and expressed their satisfaction that all CFC production would
end in 2010.
Awareness of the GHGs on global climate change has been much slower than awareness of the impact of
CFC on the ozone hole. The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) was founded in 1989.
The scientific hypothesis that connects CO2 and global climate change has been clearly formulated but an
agreement on this hypothesis has not yet reached the same level of consensus as for CFC and the ozone
hole. The Kyoto protocol was open for ratifications in 1998, but it sets binding targets for only 36 industrial
countries so far. Moreover, the Nations’ commitment (i.e. countries in Annex B of the Protocol) to reduce
emissions by 5.2% on the period 1990/2012 will not be reached. To say the least, the Copenhagen meeting,
in December 2009, did not lead to an international binding agreement.
Deforestation had remained largely ignored by the Kyoto protocol. Firstly, deforestation mainly occurs in
developing countries (which are not in Annex B). Secondly, following the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, these countries did not have to commit to any reduction of emissions. Furthermore, despite international debate on this issue, forest conservation projects are excluded from the Clean
Development Mechanism.12
This timing of events will have important consequences in the awareness process that occurred in the companies.
Stage 1: Awareness/Risk
Keeping this historical context in mind, we are now discussing similarities and differences in the strategies of
DuPont for the CFC risk and Lafarge for CO2 risk. In both cases, the emissions concern the manufacturing
operations of these companies.

11. We interviewed executives from these three companies but also from other companies in the same sectors. We also interviewed financial analysts. We are indebted to these executives for their responses to our inquiry. The authors remain the sole responsible for the
views and analysis presented in this chapter.
12. This created strong incentives for firms operating in industrialized countries to involve themselves into emission reduction in developing countries.
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Awareness
The quantification of the risks for both firms is easy. In the early eighties, DuPont had 50% market share in
CFC in the US and 25% worldwide with this business accounting for 2% of total sales.13 In 2008, cement
accounted for 57% of Lafarge total sales, the cost increase in cement at a price for CO2 of 30€/t would
induce an increase in cash cost of about 20€/t (based on an emission rate of .7 ton CO2 per ton of cement).
This puts the cement industry as the most affected sector in terms of cost increase (the unit cost being
around 45€/t), making the EU cement industry vulnerable to pollution heavens (relocation in countries
that would not regulate their CO2 emissions).14
Actions at the corporate level to mitigate regulation
On both sides, awareness triggered some lobbying effort to delay regulation. DuPont launched a voluntary
effort of industry through the Alliance for Responsible CFC as early as 1980. DuPont also publicly questioned the scientific connection between CFC and the ozone hole, but founded public research to get further
evidence. Lafarge had discouraged early attempts to introduce a carbon tax in France in the nineties and
prompted industry efforts during the renegotiation phases of the successive EU-ETS to have cement classified as a “sensitive” sector to reduce the impact of a unilateral CO2 price in the EU on the competitiveness
of the industry.
Corporate commitments
The risk for business also triggered positive actions. DuPont openly recognized that if a valid scientific
connection was established between CFC and the ozone hole, it would immediately stop its CFC production. As a matter of fact, the scientific consensus was almost total prior the Montreal protocol. Consequently, in 1988, DuPont made public its decision to reduce its CFC production to zero by 1994.15 In
2000, the CEO of Lafarge made a public commitment to reduce the Lafarge emissions of CO2 by 20%
over the period 1990 to 2010. Such statements seemed to have come as surprises for operational managers
in both companies. According to internal sources, these managers did not consider that it would be feasible.
No change in boundary systems but a slight adaptation of internal control systems
At the operational level, both companies integrated CFC and CO2 risks respectively as being part of their
business as usual. In DuPont, which is a ‘science’ company making its profit on technical innovations, the
CFC risk induced R&D programs to elaborate substitutes to CFC, but the R&D budget remained in line
with the average R&D spending in other areas. Lafarge operational commitment for CO2 was associated
with its ongoing energy efficiency program which involved optimization of inputs (gas, coal, electricity,
biomass,…), optimization of yields, as well as the incremental substitution of cementations materials (slag,
flying ashes) for clinker, being the high energy intensive ingredient in cement. Thus, in both companies,
no radical change was encouraged through specific new programs and/or design of specific incentives. The
nature of these operations demonstrates that both companies’ boundary systems had not changed.
Differentiated impacts on beliefs systems
There are some interesting differences between the two companies in terms of beliefs systems. For DuPont,
13. For a detailed account of DuPont CFC strategy, see Smith (1998). The data mentioned in this chapter in relation to CFC mostly
comes from this article.
14. Competitiveness issues for the cement industry are discussed in particular in Hourcade et al. (2007). See Ponssard &Walker (2008)
for a quantification of these issues.
15. DuPont had just developed a clean substitute for CFC at that time. This certainly helped to make that a decision that was considered as
a complete reversal by other members of the Alliance for Responsible CFC. Still the commitment to eliminate CFC by 1994 remained
ambitious due to the many applications and the sunk investments in these applications.
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its CFC strategy has been progressively reintegrated into its larger corporate environmental targets. DuPont
environmental commitments in 1989 involved 70% reductions in air toxics and 90% reductions in air carcinogens, 35% less in hazardous waste. In 1994, DuPont further committed to a 40% reduction in GHG
emissions (2000/1990).16 In contrast, Lafarge operations in CO2 were not connected to its long standing
commitment on environmental issues (the license to operate for cement plants requires special attention to
local stakeholders for quarries, logistics, emissions of gases and dust; this also concerns the other activities of
Lafarge, thus its global involvement in environmental issues). Interestingly, Lafarge had its CO2 goal certified by WWF in 2000, but did not use this partnership to change its beliefs systems. CO2 remained a public
relation issue at the corporate office to quantify the risk for the company and external lobbying efforts, and
a reinforcement issue on energy efficiency programs for operations.
Stage 2: Vision/Opportunities
So far, in our analysis, climate change issues have not substantially changed the vision of the firm. At this
point in the analysis, we will look at a “turnaround”, something that denotes that the “frame” used to stimulate initiatives, evaluate decisions, promote managers, has changed.
DuPont, as a result of CFC has a clear historical advantage in this matter. It provides an illustrative example
of such a change. Unilever will provide another illustration.
Changes in beliefs systems at DuPont
In 1999, DuPont coined a new term to describe its vision, “sustainable growth”. This vision was associated
with a major move of the company from fossil fuel technology to green technology. It acquired Pioneer in
1997, a major seed and biotechnology company and divested Conoco in 1998, a major oil company (acquired only a few years earlier). Its commitments were reformulated to highlight the change. The sustainability
targets made in 1999 for 2010 involved a large spectrum of new goals: (1) to be flat on energy (base 1990)
in spite of growth, (2) to source 10% of its energy use from renewable energy, (3) to remain below 65% in
terms of its total GHG emissions compared to 1990, (4) to generate 25% revenues from products based on
non-renewable resources. As a result of these major strategic choices, DuPont’s beliefs systems shifted from
just thinking of CO2 as a liability/cost reduction issue to thinking about it as an opportunity issue as well.
Changes in beliefs systems at Unilever
As seen in figure 2, CO2 direct emissions from Unilever are relatively low. However, the indirect impacts of
Unilever activities on climate change are very significant. We already mentioned the case of deforestation.17
Overall deforestation accounts for approximately 18 % of world total CO2 emissions. Indonesia alone holds
the global record for GHG emissions from deforestation, putting this country in the third place behind the
USA and China in terms of total GHG emissions from human activity. That is the reason why, being the
world leader buyer of palm oil, Unilever has been targeted by Greenpeace as fueling climate change. Taking
now other products of Unilever such as detergents and personal care products, the usages of these products
are intensive in energy. As a matter of fact, while manufacturing activities in Unilever are not accountable
for large CO2 emissions, suppliers and customers of Unilever products are. To face to this challenge, Unilever introduced its new vision about climate change around 2006, following an earlier awareness/risk phase
similar to the one described above. The reduction of CO2 emissions for Unilever is now part of its overall
vision to minimize its environmental footprint (water, sustainable agriculture, energy, packaging…) all
along the value added chain while delivering valuable consumer goods.
16. By 2003, it had reduced its emissions by 72%. Then it reset its base line in 2004, see current target figure 2.
17. On the link between Unilever and deforestation see the Greenpeace report (2008).
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Changes in boundary systems
The reformulation of the CO2 issue as a whole value-chain issue can be illustrated through the launching
of long term global programs. DuPont has engaged in the developing of the next generation of bio-fuels:
Cellulosic ethanol, a joint venture with Danisco, and Biobutanol, under development with BP. DuPont
also creates value-adding materials from renewable-sourced feed-stocks and bio-based ingredients for various industrial applications. DuPont is expecting that 60% of its business will stem from the use of
biotechnology to reduce fossil fuels in the next decades. Such expectations need to be evaluated in the
context of changes in the whole value chain with their indirect consequences for agricultural sustainability.
In 2004, Unilever became a founding member of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). In
May 2008, following a public challenge from Greenpeace, Unilever formalized its commitment to draw
all its palm oil from certified sustainable sources by 2015. Through the RSPO, the company supports an
initiative to put pressure on suppliers and users of palm oil to change their ways via certification bodies
and NGOs. The future of this initiative remains uncertain, given the many usages of palm oil, often in
small proportions to other ingredients, and by the many players at each level of the value added chain.18
In some other activities, the global strategy seems easier to implement, such as in tea, an activity in which
Unilever is also a world leader (Poret, 2009). In 2007, Unilever announced its commitment to achieve in
2015 a sourcing of all its tea sustainably from a Rainforest Alliance Certification. This certification involves
measurements on ten sustainability indicators for producers: soil fertility, soil loss, nutrients, pest management, biodiversity, product value, energy, water, social capital and local economy. In all its divisions, Unilever managers implement a “Brand Imprint Tool” that prompts them to “think about where they source
their ingredients and how they can get value from communicating this to consumers” (Paul Polman, Chief
Executive Officer, Unilever website).
Diagnostic and interactive systems are systematically changed
To elect as part of a stage 2 strategy, we have to see how these visions have been integrated into firms’
management and management systems. The fact that the organizational chart and the control systems
have changed are illustrative of such integration. For example, at DuPont, we now have a VP Chief
Sustainability Officer, a Sustainable Growth Review for each business, a Corporate Environmental Plan,
a more systematic link to compensation, decentralized competence centers for sustainable growth, local
champions, awards, etc. At Unilever, there are a Board-level Corporate Responsibility and Reputation
Committee and a Corporate Responsibility, Issues, Sustainability and Partnerships (CRISP) leadership
team, which review the BU strategic plans along the key performance indicators (KPIs) associated with
the global sustainability targets. This illustrates the importance of both quantitative (KPIs) and subjective
indicators (such as symbolic prizes associated to local champions and awards) in the incentive systems
when conducting strategic renewal.

18. O
�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
n December 11, 2009 Unilever announced that it suspended its supplies from Sinar Mas, until it provides substantial, evidence that
its operations did not involved deforestation in Indonesia. Greenpeace considered this as a consequence of its pressure on Unilever.
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Putting the Pieces Together

The next two figures (3&4) summarize our two-stage model and its application to the DuPont case.

CO2 Strategic Approach

STAGE 1

STAGE 2

Awareness/Risk

Vision/Opportunities

Beliefs Systems

–N
 o change

– I ntegration of the climate policy
strategy in the firm’s vision

Boundary Systems

–N
 o change

– S ystematic review of portfolios’
activities including suppliers and
clients’ relationships

Diagnostic Systems

Interactive Systems

–M
 easurement of CO2 emissions at – ( Re)designing of the firm’s position
plant level
in the value chain targets’ setting
– I ncremental and local adaptation – I ntegration of environmental issues
of energy efficiency programs
in strategic reviews
–C
 ompliance approach (regulation) – J oint design and cross-functional
implementation of diagnostic and
–F
 ocus at corporate level on risks
interactive systems
associated with ongoing and future – I ntroduction of financial and symregulation
bolic motivations
Figure 3: The Two Stage Model

CO2 Strategic Approach

STAGE 1 (1980-1999)

STAGE 2 (1999-2009)

Awareness/Risk

Vision/Opportunities

Beliefs Systems

–A
 s regards environmental issues,
ongoing compliance beliefs systems are not affected

–N
 ew vision: holistic approach to
sustainability through voluntary
actions including “footprint reduction goals” and for the first time
“market-facing goals”

Boundary Systems

–N
 o questioning of DuPont’s portfolio since CFC represents only
2% of total sales

–M
 ajor move from fossil fuel technology to green technology
–P
 artnerships along the value chain

Diagnostic Systems

–M
 easurement of CFCs emissions
at plant level
–R
 &D programs to generate
substitutes

Interactive Systems

–L
 aunch of the Alliance for
Responsible CFC to preempt
regulation
–D
 irect involvement in the elaboration of the Montreal protocol

–C
 hange of organizational chart
and control systems
–N
 omination of a VP Chief Sustainability Officer,
– I mplementation of a Sustainable
Growth Review for each business
–C
 ross-functional competence
centers
–L
 ocal champions and awards

Figure 4: Application to DuPont
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Our analysis confirms the importance of transforming the four types of management systems in accordance
with the CSR challenge. It also demonstrates that shifting from a stage one strategy based on risk and
compliance to a stage two strategy whose goal is to generate new innovations and strategic opportunities
requires: 1) a cross-functional approach, and 2) a coherent transformation of the four systems aligned with
the new strategic targets. As claimed, it provides a more nuanced view than the broad picture described in
section 2. As it will be seen shortly, it also provides a systematic framework to organize case studies.

The Porter Hypothesis Revisited: What Have We Learnt?
In this section, we come back to the Porter hypothesis. Will an increased environmental pressure for the
reduction of CO2 emissions generate more profitability? Our contribution will be discussed at two micro
levels: the firm level and the sector level.19 We build on our exploratory research to formulate questions that
look interesting to pursue.
There are probably as many case studies in which firms benefit from more stringent environmental regulation and societal pressure as ones in which they experience an increase in costs and a reduction in profits.
Our own case studies confirm these ambiguous results. But we can go one step further since we propose a
systematic framework to organize these cases studies. It suggests that the beneficial case studies would be
more likely to be in stage two and the detrimental ones in stage one. A systematic test of this proposition
would bring light on the capacity of the corresponding firms to either take full benefit of the change or
be sucked in a compliance/risk strategy. Our main contribution on this question concerns the hypothesis
that, to be in stage two, a firm must design its management systems in order to be in an alignment of the
middle managers with the vision of the firm formulated at the corporate level. Another contribution of our
analysis concerns the dynamic nature of stage two. The strategic turnaround that we associate with such a
repositioning implies that the potential benefit is risky and long termed. It certainly cannot be considered
as a “free lunch” as suggested by a literal interpretation of the Porter hypothesis.
A more general question may be stated at the sector level. For instance, are there structural factors that
would imply that firms in the cement sector would be more likely to be in stage one while firms in the chemical or agro-food sectors would be in stage two? In other words, would Holcim and Cemex be positioned
as Lafarge, while Bayer and Rhodia would be positioned as DuPont, and Danone and Nestlé as Unilever?
It would indeed certainly be worthwhile to see if our model may be applied at the sector level: could steel,
petroleum be considered as in stage one while chemicals, food, automobile… be considered as in stage
two? Our research suggests some clues to investigate this point: whether the nature of the sector facilitates
some diversification, whether it is concentrated on manufacturing or on the design and/or the assembly of
components, or the significance of R&D and the speed with which new products are introduced into the
portfolio…
Finally, and probably the most challenging issue, is to address the question concerning the possible identification of the key factors that would trigger the passage from stage one to stage two at the sector level.
For instance, one may consider that a sustained high price for petroleum would accelerate the passage of
chemicals from stage one to stage two, assuming that it is not already there. The identification of some
firms already in stage two, in a sector to be globally considered in stage one, would also be a key factor. For
instance, it may be that some firms in the construction sector are already in stage two: such as construction
19. We leave aside the macro level.
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builders which may have more flexibility to adjust their strategies than the manufacturers of cement and
steel. Our research does indeed emphasize the changes that occur along the whole value chain and the development of partnerships to take advantage of these changes.

Implications for Investors
In this section, we develop some implications that may be drawn from our work for investors that are
concerned with the possible impact of climate change on the value of their portfolios.
It is interesting to note that the debate about CO2 among investors is also progressively shifting away from
cost and risk toward the question on how to capitalize on financial opportunities. Investors increasingly
believe that climate change will present many business opportunities in the near future (Deutsche Bank
Advisors, 2008; Oddo Securities, 2008). According to a former leading consultancy, firms which will recognize the challenge of climate change early and elaborate on it to innovate will benefit from a competitive
advantage and therefore prosper (Lehman Brothers, 2007). However, despite acknowledging the potential
for strategic renewal regarding climate change, most investors keep assessing companies with an awareness/
risk approach and not a vision/opportunities one. For instance, the assessment tool being used the most by
investors to evaluate a firm’s CO2 emissions consists of calculating its carbon footprint, by estimating its
number of Certified Emissions Reduction (CER).20 The purpose of such calculation is to evaluate the financial gains/loss associated with the virtual valuation of these climate credits on the emission trading market
(e.g. virtual valuation since investors do not directly benefit/pay for these CER). Although this assessment
enables the identification of the firms which have mitigated their CO2 emissions (i.e. stage 1), it does not
allow the selection of the firms which have conducted strategic renewal according to climate change (i.e.
stage 2). Yet, it is this second type of companies that investors should select for their portfolios to generate
better financial performance in the long term.
For investors to shift from a stage one to a stage two approach when evaluating companies’ CO2 strategic
approaches requires building new assessment tools. Our two stage model is an attempt to fill this gap. Namely, it should provide some guiding principles to the question “which firms are in a position to materialize
what gains?” It suggests analyzing differently a company in stage one from one in stage two. In line with
recent approaches developed by brokers (Oddo Securities, 2008) and social rating agencies (Innovest, 2007)
to assess firms based on their business opportunities regarding climate change, our analysis insists on the
importance of studying the potential for strategic and organizational change generated by CO2 emissions
at the sector and firm levels. Firstly, we suggest maintaining the so-called ‘best-in-class’ approach, which
consists of selecting the best firms regarding CO2 emissions in each sector. Two reasons motivate this choice:
on the one hand, when building a portfolio, a firm must be assessed in comparison to its peers; on the other,
it cannot be ignored that most of investors will not exclude sectors such as oil or building materials from
their portfolios even if they are considered as a laggards in terms of CO2 strategies. Secondly, we suggest
identifying different scenarios according to the stage of the sector regarding CO2 strategies.
These two different scenarios can be outlined according to the following approach:
 Scenario 1 - the whole sector is at stage one: in a few sectors, all firms appear to be more or less at stage
one regarding CO2 emissions, possibly in real estate, oil or building materials. In such cases, the tra20. Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) are climate credits (or carbon credits) issued by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
Executive Board for emission reductions achieved by CDM projects and verified by a Department of Energy under the rules of the
Kyoto Protocol.
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ditional approach based on risk/awareness when assessing firms would be the rule. For instance, an
investor could start by identifying the level of CO2 emissions associated with the firm’s operations and
ask for actions that mitigate these emissions. It could proceed to identify the CO2 content associated
with the products, anticipating that a carbon tax of this content will affect the market value of these
products.
 Scenario 2 - at least one firm in the sector is at stage two: this means that climate change has generated
business opportunities for the sector, possibly in chemicals, water or food products sectors. When
faced with this situation, an investor must favor the most promising firms regarding CO2 strategies.
These firms can be identified using the different characteristics developed in the second stage of our
model, such as the reformulation of the firm’s vision, corporate culture, the integration of dedicated
diagnostic, interactive systems in the general planning and control systems of the firm.
A more challenging grid would ask why and when a firm would move from stage one to stage two. Our
analysis suggests that the key factors to consider would be the following ones:
– The ‘new vision’ that incorporates climate change as a major ingredient of the company culture should
be based upon in depth internal studies identifying the risks for the company and its capacity to successfully address these risks in a stage one strategy.
– The involvement of the CEO in the formulation and the communication of the new vision is a key
factor, which is usual in organization theory. To discern such an involvement from green washing, it
seems important to link the CEO vision to the formulation of explicit new CSR targets.
– The quantification of these new targets should be integrated in the management control systems; note
that it is possible to evaluate from outside if this is the case through an analysis of the KPIs introduced
at the business unit levels, along with changes in the compensation package, as well as in changes in
the general strategic review process.
– The identification of a stage two strategy remains the change in the carbon intensity of the portfolio
of activities of the firm, as well as their positioning into the whole value chain; the capacity of the firm
to articulate its current strategy in this respect provides a direct indication that its vision has changed
its boundary systems and is delivering results.
An interesting factor for assessing the change from stage one to stage two may be that the firm now engages
into positive partnerships and interactions with NGOs and scientists to formulate and implement its strategy.
This move from stage one to stage two is easier to identify in the second scenario (i.e. at least one firm in
the sector is at stage two) than in the first scenario (i.e. all firms are at stage one). Indeed, in the second
scenario, other firms can be assessed in comparison to the sector leader. In case of the first scenario, the
reasons which explain why no firm has been in stage two must be searched: do the technical problems that
prevent from innovations require major breakthroughs? Are clients reluctant to change? Have the leaders
an interest in the status quo? Are the competitive forces not so important? And so forth. Once the reasons
identified, investors may choose 1) to keep using a stage one approach when selecting the firms in the sector;
2) to encourage the leaders of the sector to shift from stage one to stage two; 3) to favor firms at stage two
belonging to other sectors but which can be good substitutes (for example, investing in firms belonging
to the oil services sector instead of the more classical integrated oil & gas sector). While our research has
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identified the existence of different stages to position a sector, further research is clearly needed to explain
what prevents some sectors from shifting from stage one to stage two.

Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to revisit the Porter hypothesis from a managerial perspective. We have
proposed a framework to position a climate change strategy of a firm consisting of a simple two stage model:
awareness/risk, in which compliance and incremental improvements are the rule, and vision/opportunity,
which may induce a more global re-assessment of the portfolio of the firm including its relationship with
suppliers and clients. Our construction is based upon three case studies: DuPont (chemicals), Lafarge (building materials) and Unilever (consumer goods).
The results have been used to revisit the possible relationship between an increase in environmental
constraints and the profitability of the firm, contingently at the stage the firm is considered to be in. Moreover, a number of key factors that may trigger the shift from stage one to stage two have been identified:
integration of the climate change policy into the beliefs systems of the firm, involvement of the CEO in
the formulation of the environmental targets for the whole company, integration of these targets into the
planning and control systems.
Our work suffers from a number of limitations: our empirical base should clearly be extended. This may
lead to a refinement of the model. At some point, this should generate a number of hypotheses that would
be amenable to systematic testing. On the more practical side, the implications we have developed for investors should be made more operational. In spite of its limitations, firms and investors may also be interested
in using our model to position their own strategy. The clear architecture of the model would facilitate this
positioning and, hopefully, provide a useful starting block for further analysis.
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